Many emerging Web services, such as email, photo sharing, and web site archives, need to preserve large amounts of quickly-accessible data indefinitely into the future. In this paper, we make the case that these applications' demands on large scale storage systems over long time horizons require us to re-evaluate traditional storage system designs. We examine threats to long-lived data from an end-to-end perspective, taking into account not just hardware and software faults but also faults due to humans and organizations. We present a simple model of long-term storage failures that helps us reason about the various strategies for addressing these threats in a cost-effective manner. Using this model we show that the most important strategies for increasing the reliability of long-term storage are detecting latent faults quickly, automating fault repair to make it faster and cheaper, and increasing the independence of data replicas.
Introduction
Frequent headlines remind us that bits, even bits stored in expensive, professionally administered data centers, are vulnerable to loss and damage [18, 21, 30, 38] . Despite this, emerging web services such as e-mail (e.g., Gmail), photo sharing (e.g., Snapfish, Ofoto, Shutterfly) 1 and archives (e.g., The Internet Archive) require large volumes of data to be stored indefinitely into the future. The economic viability of these services depends on storing the data at very low cost. Customer acceptance of these services depends on the data remaining both unaltered and accessible with low latency.
Satisfying these requirements over long periods of time would be easy if fast, cheap, reliable disks were available, and if threats to the data were confined to the storage subsystem itself. Unfortunately, neither is true. The economics of high-volume manufacturing provide a choice between consumer-grade drives, which are 1 All trademarks mentioned in this paper belong to their respective owners.
cheap, fairly fast, and fairly reliable, and enterprise-grade drives, which are vastly more expensive, much faster but only a little more reliable. In § 6.1 we show that an enterprise drive fourteen times more expensive than a consumer drive only reduces bit errors from 8 to 6 over a 5-year, 99% idle lifetime. For short-lived data, this level of reliability might not pose a problem, but for long-lived data these faults are inescapable.
Further, long-term storage faces many threats beyond the storage system itself. These include obsolescence of data formats, long-term attacks on the data, and economic and structural volatility of organizations sponsoring the storage.
In this paper, we make the case that long-term reliable storage is a problem that deserves a fresh look, given its significant differences from traditional storage problems addressed in the literature. We start by motivating the need for digital preservation -storing immutable data over long periods ( § 2). We then list the threats that imperil data survival using examples from real systems ( § 3), and examine why the design philosophy of many current storage systems is insufficient for long-term storage ( § 4).
To understand the implications of this problem better, we introduce a simple reliability model ( § 5) of replicated storage systems designed to address long-term storage threats. This model is inspired by the reliability model for RAID [42] , but our extensions and interpretation of the model take a more holistic, end-to-end, rather than device-oriented, approach. Our model includes a wider range of faults to which the replicas are subject. It explicitly incorporates both latent faults, which occur long before they are detected, and correlated faults, when one fault causes others or when multiple faults result from the same error ( § 4). Our model incorporates and highlights the importance of a detection process for latent faults.
Although our model is simplistic, it highlights needed areas for gathering reliability data, and it helps evaluate strategies for improving the reliability of systems for long-lived data ( § 6). For example, we would like to be able to answer questions such as, how dangerous are latent faults over long time periods? (Quite dangerous, § 5.4.) Would it be better to replicate an archive on tape or on disk? (Disk, § 6.2.) Is it better to increase the mean time between visible faults or between latent faults? (Perhaps neither if it significantly decreases the other, § 5.4.) Is it better to increase replication in the system or increase the independence of existing replicas? (Both, but replication without increasing independence does not help much, § 5.5.) Some of these strategies have been proposed before ( § 7), but we believe they are worth revisiting in the context of long-term storage.
We conclude ( § 8) that the most important strategies for increasing reliability of long-term storage are detecting latent faults quickly, automating the repair of faults to be faster and cheaper, and increasing the independence of data replicas. This includes increasing geographic, administrative, organizational, and third-party independence, as well as the diversity of hardware and software. We hope that our analysis and conclusions, while still primitive, will motivate a renewed look at the design of storage systems that must preserve data for decades in volatile and even hostile environments.
The Need for Long-term Preservation
Preserving information for decades or even centuries has proved beneficial in many cases. In the 12th century BC Shang dynasty Chinese astronomers inscribed eclipse observations on "oracle bones" (animal bones and tortoise shells). About 3200 years later researchers used these records, together with one from 1302BC, to estimate that the total clock error that had accumulated was just over 7 hours, and from this derived a value for the viscosity of the Earth's mantle as it rebounds from the weight of the glaciers [41] .
Longitudinal studies in the field of medical research depend upon accurate preservation of detailed patient records for decades. In 1948 scientists began to study the residents of Framingham, Massachusetts [13] to understand the large increase in heart disease victims throughout the 1930s and 40s. Using data collected over decades of research, scientists discovered the major risk factors that modern medicine now knows contribute to heart disease.
In 1975, the former USSR sent two probes, Venera 9 and 10, to the surface of Venus to collect data and photographs. The resulting photographs were of very low quality and were relegated to the dustbin of science history. About 28 years later, an American scientist was able to use modern digital image processing algorithms to enhance the photographs to reveal much more detailed images [60] .
These timescales of many decades, even centuries, contrast with the typical 5-year lifetime for computing hardware and similar lifetimes attributed to digital media. It is not just scientific data that is expected to persist over these timescales. Legislation such as SarbanesOxley [2] and HIPPA [1] require many companies and organizations to keep electronic records over decades. In addition, consumers used to analog assets such as mail and photographs, which persist over many decades, are now happily entrusting their digital versions to online services. The associated marketing literature [16] encourages them to expect similar longevity.
Threats to Long-term Preservation
While traditional short-term storage applications must also anticipate a variety of threats, the list of threats to long-term storage is longer and more diverse. Some threats, such as media and software obsolescence, are particular to long-term preservation. Other threats, such as natural disaster and human error, are also threats to short-term storage applications, but the probability of their occurrence is higher over the longer desired lifetimes for archival data. In this section we list threats to long-term storage and provide real examples to motivate them. We take an end-to-end approach in identifying failures, concentrating not just on storage device faults but also on faults in the environment, processes, and support surrounding the storage systems. Large-scale disaster. Large-scale disasters, such as floods, fires, earthquakes, and acts of war must be anticipated over the long desired lifetimes of archival data. Such disasters will typically be manifested by other types of threat, such as media, hardware, and organizational faults, and sometimes all of these, as was the case with many of the data centers affected by the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center. Human error. One of the ways in which data are lost is through users or operators accidentally deleting (or marking as overwriteable) content they still need, or accidentally or purposefully deleting data for which they later discover a need. For instance, rumors suggest that large professionally administered digital repositories have suffered administrative errors that caused data loss across replicas, but the organizations hosting these repositories are unwilling to report the mishaps publicly (see § 8). Sometimes the errors instead affect hardware (e.g., tapes being lost in transit [46] ), software (e.g., uninstalling a required driver), or infrastructure (e.g., turning off the air-conditioning system in the server room) on which the preservation application runs. Human error is increasingly the cause of system failures [40, 45] . Component faults. Taking an end-to-end view of a system, all components can be expected to fail, including hardware, software, network interfaces, and even thirdparty services. Hardware components suffer transient re-coverable faults (e.g., caused by temporary power loss) and catastrophic irrecoverable faults (e.g., a power surge fries a controller card). Software components, including firmware in disks, suffer from bugs that pose a risk to the stored data. Systems cannot assume that the network transfers they use to ingest or disseminate content will terminate within a specified time period, or will actually deliver the content unaltered. (The initial ingestion of large collections into a repository is thus itself errorprone.) Third-party components that cannot easily themselves be preserved are also sources of problems. External license servers or the companies that run them might no longer exist decades after an application and its data are archived. Domain names will vanish or be reassigned if the registrant fails to pay the registrar, and a persistent URL [39] will not resolve if the resolver service fails to preserve its data with as much care as the storage system client. Media faults. The storage medium is a component of particular interest. No affordable digital storage medium is completely reliable over long periods of time, since the medium can degrade; degradation and other such medium errors can cause irrecoverable bit faults, often called bit rot. Storage media are also subject to sudden irrecoverable loss of bulk data from, for instance, disk crashes [53] . Bit rot is particularly troublesome, because it occurs without warning and might not be detected until it is too late to make repairs. The most familiar example might be CD-ROMs. Studies of CD-ROMs [20, 31] indicate that despite being sold as reliable for decades, or even 75 to 100 years, they are often only good for two to five years, even when stored in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations.
Disks are subject to similar problems. For instance, a previously readable sector can become unreadable. Or a sector might be readable but contain the wrong information due to a previously misplaced sector write, often due to problems with vibrations [4] . Media/hardware obsolescence. Over time, media and hardware components can become obsolete -no longer able to communicate with other system componentsor irreplaceable after a fault. This problem is particularly acute for removable media, which have a long history of remaining theoretically readable if only a suitable reader could be found [25] . Examples include 9-track tape and 12-inch video laser discs. Evolution of the industry specification for PCs has made it difficult to purchase a commodity PC with built-in floppy drive, indicating that even floppy disks, once considered an obvious ubiquitous cheap storage medium, are endangered. Software/format obsolescence. Similarly, software components become obsolete. This is often manifested as format obsolescence: the bits in which the data were encoded remain accessible, but the information can no longer be correctly interpreted. Proprietary formats, even those in widespread use, are very vulnerable. For instance, digital camera companies have their own proprietary "RAW" formats for recording the raw data from their cameras. These formats are often undocumented, and when a company ceases to exist or to support its format, photographers can lose vast amounts of data [54] . Loss of context. Metadata, or more generally "context," includes information about layout, location, and interrelationships among stored objects, as well as the subject and provenance of content, and the processes, algorithms and software needed to manipulate them. Preserving contextual metadata is as important as preserving the actual data, and it can even be hard to recognize all required context in time to collect it. Encrypted information is a particularly challenging example, since preservation of the decryption keys is essential alongside preservation of the encrypted data. Unfortunately, over long periods of time, secrets (such as decryption keys) tend to get lost, to leak, or to get broken [14] . This problem is less of a threat to short-term storage applications, where the assets do not live long enough for the context to be lost or the information to become uninterpretable. Attack. Traditional repositories are subject to long-term malicious attack, and there is no reason to expect their digital equivalents to be exempt. Attacks include destruction, censorship, modification and theft of repositories' contents, and disruption of their services [55] . The attacks can be short-term or long-term, legal or illegal, internal or external. They can be motivated by ideological, political, financial or legal factors, by bragging rights or by employee dissatisfaction. Attacks are a threat to short-term storage as well, but researchers usually focus on short-term, intense attacks, rather than the slowly subversive attacks that afflict long-term repositories. Because much abuse of computer systems involves insiders [24] , a digital preservation system must anticipate attack even if it is completely isolated from external networks. Examples of attacks include cases of "sanitization" of US government websites to conform with the administration's world view [19, 35] . Organizational faults. A system view of long-term storage must include not merely the technology but also the organization in which it is embedded. These organizations can die out, perhaps through bankruptcy, or change missions. This can deprive the storage technology of the support it needs to survive. System planning must envisage the possibility of the asset represented by the preserved content being transferred to a successor organization, or otherwise being properly disposed of with a data "exit strategy." Storage services can also make mistakes, and assets dependent on a single service can be lost.
As an example, during an organizational change, a large IT company closed a research lab and requested the lab's research projects be copied to tape and sent to another of its labs. Unfortunately, few knew about these tapes and they were allowed to languish without documentation of their contents. When it became clear that some of the project data would be useful to current researchers, enough time had passed that nobody could identify what would be on which tape, and the volume of data was too huge to reconstruct an index [28] .
As another example, a user lost all of her digital photos stored at Ofoto when she did not make a purchase within the required interval and did not receive their email warnings due to having failed to send them her updated email address [29] . Further, for many of these services there is no "data exit strategy" for easy bulk retrieval of the original high-resolution format of all of of the customer's photos. Economic faults. Many organizations with materials to preserve do not have large budgets to apply to the problem, and declare success after just managing to get a collection put online. Unfortunately, this provides no plan for maintaining a collection's accessibility or quality in the future. There are ongoing costs for power, cooling, bandwidth, system administration, equipment space, domain registration, renewal of equipment, and so on. Information in digital form is much more vulnerable to interruptions in the money supply than information on paper, and budgets for digital preservation must be expected to vary up and down, possibly even to zero, over time. These budget issues affect our ability to preserve as many collections as desired: many libraries now subscribe to fewer serials and monographs [6] .
Motivating an investment in preservation can be difficult [17] without better tools to predict long-term costs, especially if the target audience for the preserved information does not exist at the time decisions are made. While budget is an issue in the purchase of any storage system, it is usually easier to plan how money will be spent over a shorter lifespan.
Dangerous Assumptions
Some of the threats above are well-understood and we should have succeeded in solving these problems by now. So why do we still lose data? Part of the reason is that our system designs often fail to take an end-to-end perspective, and that, in practice, we often make a few key, but potentially dangerous assumptions. These include visibility of faults ( § 4.1), independence of faults ( § 4.2), and enough money to apply exotic solutions ( § 4.3), as described below.
The fault visibility assumption
While many faults are detected at the time an error causes them, some occur silently. These are called "latent faults." There are many sources of latent faults, but media errors are the best known. While a head crash would be detectable, bit rot might not be uncovered until the affected faulty data are actually accessed and audited. As another example, a sector on a disk might become unreadable; this would not be detected until the next read of that sector. Further, a sector might be readable but contain incorrect information due to a previous misplaced sector write. Silent media errors and faults occur more frequently than many of us have assumed; for instance Schwarz et al. suggest that silent block faults occur five times as often as whole disk faults [50] .
In aggregate, archives such as the Internet Archive might supply users with data items at a high rate, but the average data item is accessed infrequently. Detecting loss or corruption only when a user requests access renders the average data item vulnerable to an accumulation of latent faults [23, 34, 50] .
While the need to guard against latent faults has long been recognized in larger systems [8, 23, 50] , increases in storage capacity have recently brought more attention to the problem for commodity storage. An important example is the IRON File System [44] , which uses redundancy within a single disk to address latent faults within file system metadata structures.
Beyond media faults, there are many types of latent faults caused by threats in § 3:
• Human error: accidental deletion or overwriting of materials might not be discovered until those materials are needed.
• Component failure: The reliance on a failed system component or a third-party component that is no longer available might not be discovered until data depending on that component are accessed.
• Media/hardware obsolescence: Failure of an obsolete, seldom-used media reader might not be discovered until information on the associated medium needs to be read. It might then be impossible or too costly to purchase another reader.
• Software/format obsolescence: Upon accessing old information we might discover it is in a format belonging to an application we can no longer run.
• Loss of context: We might not discover we are missing crucial metadata about saved data until we try to make sense of the data. For instance, we might not have preserved an encryption key.
• Attack: Results of a successful censorship or corruption attack on a data repository might never be discovered, or might only become apparent upon accessing the data long after the attack. The general solution to latent faults is to detect them as quickly as possible, as indicated by our model in § 6. For instance, "scrubbing" [23, 33, 50] can be used to detect media faults or evidence of data corruption from an attack. If preserving the data is important, scrubbing should be performed while the data can still be repaired from a replica (or error correction codes). At a higher layer, we can prevent latent faults in the making by detecting the need to migrate content from old to new media or from old to new data formats before we have lost the ability to read the old medium or interpret the old data format. Another example is detecting the need to re-encrypt old materials with new keys before old keys are considered obsolete.
The independence assumption
Many researchers and designers correctly point to data replication as a strategy for preventing data loss, but make the assumption that replicas fail independently. Alas, in practice, faults are not as independent as we might hope. Talagala [53] logged every fault in a large disk farm (of 368 disk drives) at UC Berkeley over six months and showed significant correlations between them. (For example, if power units are shared across drives, a single power outage can affect a large number of drives.) A single power outage accounted for 22% of all machine restarts. Temperature and vibrations of tightly packed devices in machine room racks [4, 32] are also sources of correlated media failures.
Taking an end-to-end perspective, there are many sources of fault correlation corresponding to the threats in § 3:
• Large-scale disaster: A single large disaster might destroy all replicas of the data. Geographic replication clearly helps, but care must be taken to ensure it provides sufficient independence. For example, in the 2001 9/11 disaster in New York City, a data center was destroyed. The system failed over to a replicated data center on the other side of a river, and the failover worked correctly. Unfortunately, the sites were still not sufficiently distant; the chaos in the streets prevented staff from getting to the backup data center. Eventually it was unable to continue unattended [56] .
• Human error: System administrators are human and fallible. Unfortunately, in most systems they are also very powerful, able to destroy or modify data without restriction. If all replicas are under unified administrative control, a single human error can cause faults at all of them.
• Component faults: If all replicas of the information are dependent on the same external component, for instance a license server, the loss of that component causes correlated faults at every replica.
• Loss of context: Losing metadata associated with archival data might cause correlated faults across replicas. For instance, if materials are encrypted with the same key at all replicas, loss of that key will make all the replicas useless.
• Attack: Attacks can cause correlated faults. For instance, a flash worm might affect many replicas at once.
• Organizational faults: Long-term storage must anticipate the failure of any one organization or service. Increasing the visibility of digital assets and developing simple exit strategies for data is important, but so is minimizing dependence on any single organization.
As indicated in § 6 by our model, the best way to avoid correlated faults is independence of the replicas. Simply increasing the replication is not enough if we do not also ensure the independence of the replicas geographically, administratively, and otherwise.
The unlimited budget assumption
The biggest threats to digital preservation are economic faults. With a lot of money we could apply many solutions to preserving data, but most of the information people would like to see live forever is not in the hands of organizations with unlimited budgets. Solutions such as synchronous mirroring of RAIDs across widely dispersed geographic replicas might not be affordable over the long term for many organizations. Although we make a qualitative attempt to compare the costs of some of the strategies and solutions we explore in this paper, estimation of these costs remains very difficult and is an area richly deserving further work.
Analytic Model
Abstract models such as that in Patterson et al. [42] and Chen et al. [9] are useful for reasoning about the reliability of different replicated storage system designs. In this section, we build upon these models to further incorporate the effect of latent and correlated faults on the overall reliability of an arbitrary unit of replicated data. Our model is agnostic to the unit of replication; it can be a bit, a sector, a file, a disk or an entire storage site. We therefore attempt to develop a more abstract model that can be interpreted in a more general, holistic fashion. While still coarse-grained, our model is nonetheless helpful for reasoning about the relative impact of a broader range of faults, their detection times, their repair times, and their correlation. The model helps point out what strategies are most likely to increase reliability, and what data we need to measure in real systems to resolve tradeoffs between these strategies.
We start with a simple, abstract definition of latent faults. We then derive the mean-time-to-failure of mirrored data, in the face of both immediately visible and latent faults. We extend this equation to include the effect of correlated faults. Finally, we discuss the implications of this equation for long-term storage. 
Fault types
We assume that there are two types of faults: immediately visible and latent, as shown in Figure 1 . Visible faults are those for which the time between their occurrence and detection is negligible. Causes of such faults include entire-disk or controller errors. We denote the mean time to a visible fault by MV and the associated mean time to repair by MRV. Latent faults are those for which the time between occurrence and detection is significant. Examples include misdirected writes, bit rot, unreadable sectors, and data stored in obsolete formats. We denote the mean time to a latent fault by ML and mean time to repair by MRL. We only consider latent faults that are detectable; hence, they have a finite mean time between occurrence and detection, denoted by MDL.
Assumptions
Our model is based on several assumptions. We build our model starting from the simplest assumptions and increase its complexity as needed. To start, with no additional information, the simplest assumption we can make (as do others [42] ) regarding the processes that generate faults (latent or visible) is that they are memoryless. That is, the probability, P (t), of a fault occurring within time t, is independent of the past. This assumption leads to the following exponential distribution
where MTTF is the mean time to the fault. For many parts of our derivation, we consider the case where t << MTTF, so the following approximation holds
This approximation and similar ones below are used only to simplify the expression for the exponential in the probability, similar to Patterson et al. [43] , so are not fundamental to the model. Initially, we also assume that all faults occur independently of one another. Subsequently, we revise this assumption by introducing correlated errors that are also exponentially distributed but with an increased rate of occurrence. For simplicity, we model this increased rate via a multiplicative correlation factor, which is assumed to be the same for both latent and visible faults.
Furthermore, undetectable faults might also exist, but we ignore them for this analysis. Their effect on the overall reliability will dominate only if their rate of occurrence is significant. In such a case, we must turn them into detectable faults, by developing a detection mechanism for them, and correct them, by employing redundancy [27] . Otherwise, they will remain the main vulnerability for the stored data.
Reliability
Mirrored data become irrecoverable when there are two successive faults such that the copy fails before the initial fault can be repaired, an event we call a double-fault. Since a double-fault leads to data loss for mirrored replicas, for most of this section, 1 MTTDL is equal to the rate of double-fault failures, where MTTDL is the mean time to data loss. In this section, we derive an expression for this quantity, which represents the reliability of mirrored data, to understand how it is affected by visible, latent, and correlated faults. Note that the double-fault rate is meaningful regardless of whether the faults causing those failures are detected or even detectable. Thus, throughout this section, our reliability analysis is from the perspective of the data rather than the perspective of the user for whom errors can go unnoticed.
To estimate MTTDL, we first need to estimate the probability that a second fault will occur while the first fault is still unrepaired. We refer to this unrepaired period as the window of vulnerability (WOV). Since there are two types of faults, we need to consider the window of vulnerability after each type, as illustrated in Figure 2 .
First, consider the WOV after a visible fault, V 1 , which on average is MRV. During this WOV, both latent and visible faults can occur. The probability that another visible fault, V 2 occurs is
where MRV ≪ MV. We obtain this result by using the approximation in eqn 2. The probability that another latent fault, L 2 occurs is
where MRV ≪ ML. The difference between P (V 2 |V 1 ) and P (L 2 |V 1 ) arises only from the different rates of fault occurrence. Next, consider the WOV after a latent fault, L 1 , which on average is MRL + MDL. Again, during this WOV, both latent and visible faults can occur, and the difference in the two probabilities of occurrence is simply due to the different rates of occurrence for visible and latent faults.
Latent
The probability that another visible fault, V 2 occurs is
and the probability that another latent fault, L 2 , occurs is
As before, MRL + MDL ≪ MV and MRL + MDL ≪ ML. Note that if MDL becomes large, the equations do not hold and the combined P (
Next, we calculate the total double-fault failure rate as follows
where the first term on the right side counts the fraction of the visible faults that result in double-failures, and the second term counts the fraction of latent faults that result in double-failures.
To account for correlated faults, we assume that the probability of the second fault (conditioned on the occurrence of the first) is also exponentially distributed, but with a faster rate parameter. We introduce a multiplicative correlation factor α < 1 that reduces the mean time to the subsequent fault once an initial fault occurs. In this case, equations 3-6 are multiplied by 1 α . This is undoubtedly a vast simplification of how faults correlate in practice. Modeling correlations accurately relies on modeling a particular system instantiation and its component interactions, and often is considered a black art. We are at least not alone in using the simplification [11] . An alternative would be to introduce a distinct MTTF for correlated faults that is less than the independent MTTF, as done for RAID by Chen et al. [9] .
Combining the previous equations and accounting for correlated faults, MTTDL becomes
Implications
To understand the implications of equation 8, we investigate its behavior at various operating ranges. We consider the cases in which visible faults are much more frequent than latent faults and vice versa. We also consider the case in which the WOV after a latent fault occurs is long. We briefly discuss the implications in each of these cases and touch upon reliability metrics for higher levels of redundancy. First, consider the case in which the visible fault rate dominates the latent fault rate, {MRL+MDL, MRV} ≪ MV ≪ ML. Then,
because MV + ML ≈ ML and MRV · ML ≫ (MRL + MDL) · MV. In this case, the effect of latent faults is negligible, and thus the equation appropriately resembles the original RAID reliability model [42] . On the other hand, if the latent fault rate dominates the visible fault rate, {MRL+MDL, MRV} ≪ ML ≪ MV, then
because MV + ML ≈ MV and MRV · ML ≪ (MRL + MDL) · MV. Equation 10 indicates that if latent faults are frequent, we must reduce MDL, as it can negate the additional ML factor of reliability, a result of replication. Next, consider the case in which the visible fault rate dominates, MRV ≪ MV ≪ ML, but latent faults are frequent enough to be non-negligible. If the window of vulnerability after a latent fault occurs is long, then latent faults still play a role in increasing the doublefault failure rate. The WOV can be long because either the detection time for latent faults is long (MDL ≈ ML), the repair times are long (MRL ≈ ML), or both (MRL + MDL ≈ ML). In this case, P (V 2 ∨ L 2 |L 1 ) ≈ 1 in equation 7, ensuring that a single latent fault is extremely likely to lead to a double-fault failure. As a result, the approximation
holds when latent faults rates are non-negligible, i.e. ML < MV 2 . These specializations of the model point to four important implications. First, in equations 9 and 10, MTTDL varies quadratically with both MV and ML, and in particular, with the minimum of MV and ML. Thus, we must consider occurrence rates for both fault types to improve overall system reliability. We must be careful not to sacrifice one for the other, which might happen in practice, since MV and ML can often be anti-correlated depending upon hardware choice and detection strategy.
Second, equation 10 indicates that if latent faults are frequent, it is important to reduce their detection time, and not just their repair time. More specifically, consider a Seagate Cheetah disk with a MV of 1.4 × 10 6 hours, bandwidth of 300 MB/s, and capacity of 146GB, leading to MRV of 20 minutes. Following Schwarz et al. [50] ), we assume that latent faults are five times as likely as visible faults, resulting in an ML of 2.8 × 10 5 hours. Without scrubbing, we cannot justify the approximations leading to equation 10. Therefore, applying equation 7 and substituting P (V 2 ∨ L 2 |L 1 ) ≈ 1, we achieve an MTTDL = 32.0 years. This gives a 79.0% probability of data loss in 50 years if we plug it into the exponential distribution.
On the other hand, if we scrub a replica 3 times a year, as suggested by Schwarz et al., MDL is 1460 hours (which is half of the scrubbing period). Then, applying equation 10, our reliability increases significantly. With no correlated errors, MTTDL = 6128.7 years, which gives a 0.8% chance of data loss in 50 years. This implies that proactive searching for latent faults is appropriate. Other work agrees with this conclusion [23, 44, 50] .
Third, in our model, correlation is a multiplicative factor and affects the reliability regardless of the type of fault we have. Continuing with our example above, assume α = 0.1 as suggested by Chen et al. [9] . Then, MTTDL = 612.9 years, which gives a 7.8% chance of data loss in 50 years.
The above is a conservative assumption for α because this correlation factor can vary by several orders of magnitude. To obtain a reasonable lower bound on α, consider that the correlated mean-time-to-second-visiblefault can be an order of magnitude larger than the recovery time; α · MV ≥ 10 · MRV, then α ≥ 10·MRV MV . For example, a bug in the firmware recovery code for a RAID controller might cause the mean-time-to-secondfault to be not much more than the mean time to recover. To obtain a specific lower-bound value, we assume the same values as above for MV and MRV = MRL, resulting in 1 ≥ α ≥ 2 × 10 −6 , which gives a range of at least 5 orders of magnitude.
Fourth, even when latent faults are infrequent, equation 11 indicates that not attempting to detect latent faults, or relying on very lengthy recovery procedures to fix them, will leave the system vulnerable. For example, if ML = 1.4 × 10 7 , MV and MRV remain the same, and α = 0.1, then MTTDL = 159.8 years, leading to a 26.8% probablility of data loss in 50 years. In this case, because the system is negligent about handling latent faults, the data are more susceptible to double-fault failures from visible and latent faults following an initial unrepaired latent fault.
Replication and correlated faults
In this section, we show that additional replication does not offer much additional reliability without independence. To simplify our reliability analysis for higher degrees of replication, we assume that we have instrumented the system so that MDL is negligible, and we assume that latent and visible faults have similar rates and repair times. We roughly estimate the MTTDL of a system with a degree of replication, r, by extending the analysis along the same lines as for mirrored data. We calculate the probability that r − 1 successive, compounding faults after an initial fault will leave the system with no integral copy from which to recover.
To do so, we calculate the probability of r − 1 successive faults occurring within the vulnerability windows of each previous fault. For simplicity, this analysis assumes that the vulnerability windows, each of length MRV, overlap exactly. In that case, the probability that the k-th copy fails within the WOV of the previous (k − 1) failed copies is roughly MRV α·MV . Thus, the probability that successive r−1 copies all fail within the WOV of previously failed copies is the product of those r − 1 probabilities, ( MRV α·MV ) r−1 . Since the first fault occurs with rate 1 MV , the overall mean-time-to-data-loss is
This equation shows that although increasing the level of replication, r, geometrically increases MTTDL, a high degree of correlated errors (α ≪ 1) would also ge-ometrically decrease MTTDL, thereby offsetting much or all of the gains from additional replicas.
Strategies
This simple model reveals a number of strategies for reducing the probability of irrecoverable data loss. While we generally describe them in terms of the more familiar hardware and media faults, they are also applicable to other kinds of faults. For instance, in addition to detecting faults due to media errors, scrubbing can detect corruption and data loss due to attack. As another example, we can use a similar process of cycling through the data, albeit at a reduced frequency, to detect data in endangered formats and convert to new formats before we can no longer interpret the old formats.
• Increase MV by, for example, using storage media less subject to catastrophic data loss such as disk head crashes.
• Increase ML by, for example, using storage media less subject to data corruption, or formats less subject to obsolescence.
• Reduce MDL by, for example, auditing the data more frequently to detect latent data faults, as in RAID scrubbing.
• Reduce MRL by, for example, automatically repairing latent data faults rather than alerting an operator to do so.
• Reduce MRV by, for example, providing hot spare drives so that recovery can start immediately rather than once an operator has replaced a drive.
• Increase the number of replicas enough to survive more simultaneous faults.
• Increase α by increasing the independence of the replicas. In the rest of this section we examine the practicality and costs of some techniques for implementing these strategies. We provide examples of systems using these techniques.
Increase MV or ML
Based on Seagate's specifications, a 200GB consumer Barracuda drive has a 7% visible fault probability in a 5-year service life [51] , whereas a 146GB enterprise Cheetah has a 3% fault probability [52] . But the Cheetah costs about 14 times as much per byte 2 . The Barracuda has a quoted irrecoverable bit error rate of 10 −14 and the Cheetah of 10 −15 . Even if the drives spend their 5 year life 99% idle, the Barracuda will suffer about 8 and the Cheetah about 6 irrecoverable bit errors. This 14-fold increase in cost between consumer and enterprise disk drives yields approximately half the probability of in-service fault and about 3/4 the probability of irrecoverable bit fault. Thus, for long-term storage applications whose requirements for latency and individual disk bandwidth are minimal, the large incremental cost of enterprise drives is hard to justify compared to the smaller incremental cost of more (sufficiently independent) replicas on consumer drives.
Reduce MDL
A less expensive approach to addressing latent faults due to media errors is to detect the faults as soon as possible and repair them. The only way to detect these faults is to audit the replicas by reading the data and either computing checksums or comparing against other replicas.
Assuming (unrealistically) that the detection process is perfect and the latent faults occur randomly, MDL will be half the interval between audits, so the way to reduce it is to audit more frequently. Another way to put this is that one can reduce MDL by devoting more disk read bandwidth to auditing and less to reading the data; recent work suggests that in many systems we can achieve a reasonable balance of auditing versus normal system usage [44, 50] .
On-line replicas such as disk copies have significant advantages over off-line copies such as tape backups, for two reasons. First, the cost of auditing an off-line copy includes the cost of retrieving it from storage, mounting it in a reader, dismounting it and returning it to storage. This can be considerable, especially if the off-line copy is in secure off-site storage. Second, on-line media are designed to be accessed frequently and involve no errorprone human handling. They can thus be audited without the audit process itself being as significant a cause of faults (up to some limit, determined in part by the system strategy for powering components on and off [50] ). Auditing off-line copies, on the other hand, is a significant cause of highly correlated faults, from the error-prone human handling of media [46] to the media degradation caused by the reading process [3] .
The audit strategy is particularly important in the case of digital preservation systems, where the probability that an individual data item will ever be accessed by a user during a disk lifetime is vanishingly small. The system cannot depend on user access to trigger fault detection and recovery, because during the long time between accesses latent faults will build up enough to swamp recovery mechanisms. A system must therefore aggressively audit its replicas to minimize MDL. The LOCKSS system is an example of such a system.
Note that relying on off-line replicas for security is not fool-proof. Off-line storage may reduce the chances of some attacks, but it may still be vulnerable to insider attacks. Because it is harder to audit, the damage due to such attacks may persist for longer.
Reduce MRL or MRV
Although the mean time to repair a latent media fault will normally be far less than the mean time to detect it, and similarly the mean time to repair a visible fault will be far less than the mean time to its occurrence, reducing the mean time to repair is nevertheless important in reducing the window during which the system is vulnerable to correlated faults.
Again in this case, on-line replicas have the major advantage that repair times for media faults might be very short indeed, a few media access times. No human intervention is needed, and the process of repair is in itself less likely to cause additional correlated faults. Repairing from off-line media incurs the same high costs, long delays and potential correlated faults as auditing off-line media.
Increase replication
Off-line media are the most common approach to increasing replication. But the processes of auditing and recovering from faults using off-line backup copies can be slow, expensive, and error-prone.
Some options for disk-based replication strategies include replication within RAID systems, across RAID systems, and across simple mirrored replicas. Replication within RAID systems does not provide geographical or administrative independence of the replicas. If we opt for geographic and administrative independence of replicas, it might be that the extra single-site reliability provided by RAIDs is not worth the extra cost from a system-wide perspective. Further, given the cost disparity between enterprise-grade drives and consumer-grade drives (see § 1), adding more simple mirrored replicas in non-RAID configurations might well be a cost-effective approach to increasing replication and thus overall reliability. OceanStore [26] is an example of using a large number of replicas on cheap disks.
Increase independence
In just the six months of the Talagala study [53] , many correlated faults were observed, apparently caused by disks sharing power, cooling, and SCSI controllers, and systems sharing network resources. Our model suggests that in most cases, even with far lower rates of correlated faults, increasing the independence of replicas is critical to increasing the reliability of long-term storage.
Long-term storage systems can reduce the probability of correlated faults by striving for as much diversity as possible in hardware, software, geographic location, and administration, and by avoiding dependence on thirdparty components and single organizations. Examples include:
• Hardware: Disks in an array often come from a single manufacturing batch. They thus have the same firmware, same hardware and are the same age, and so are at the same point in the "bathtub" lifetime failure curve [15] . However, the increased cost that would be incurred by giving up supply chain efficiencies of bulk purchase might make hardware diversity difficult. Note, though, that replacing all components of a large archival system at once is likely to be impossible. If new storage is added in "rolling procurements" over time [7] , then differences in storage technologies and vendors over time naturally provides hardware heterogeneity.
• Software: Systems with the same software are vulnerable to epidemic failure; Junqiera et al. have studied how the natural diversity of systems on a campus can be used to reduce this vulnerability [22] . However, the increased costs caused by encouraging such diversity, in terms not merely of purchasing, but also of training and administration, might again make this a difficult option for some organizations. The British Library's system [7] is unusual in explicitly planning to develop diversity of both hardware and software over time. Nevertheless, given the speed with which malware can find all networked systems sharing a vulnerability, increasing the diversity of both platform and application software is an effective strategy for increasing α.
• Geographic location: Many systems using off-line backup store replicas off-site, despite the additional storage and handling charges that implies. Digital preservation systems, such as the British Library's, establish each of their on-line replicas in a different location, again despite the possible increased operational costs of doing so.
• Administration: Human error is a common cause of correlated faults among replicas. Again, the British Library's system is unusual in ensuring that no single administrator will be able to affect more than one replica. This is probably more effective and more cost-effective than attempts to implement "dual-key" administration, in which more than one administrator has to approve each potentially dangerous action. In a crisis, shared pre-conceptions are likely to cause both operators to make the same mistake [45] .
• Components: System designs should avoid dependence on third-party components that might not themselves be preserved over time. Determining all sources of such dependence can be tricky, but some sources can be detected by running systems in isolation to see what breaks. For example, running a system in a network without a domain name service or certificate authority can determine whether the system is dependent on those services. LOCKSS is an example of a system built to be independent of the survival of these services.
• Organization: Taking an end-to-end view of preservation systems, it is also important to support their organizational independence. For instance, if the importance of a collection extends beyond its current organization, then there must be an easy and costeffective "exit strategy" for the collection if the organization ceases to exist. As an example, bickering couples might not want the survival of their babies' photos to depend on a home IT system whose maintenance requires their continued cohabitation.
In summary, the main techniques for increasing the reliability of long-term storage are replication, independence of replicas, auditing replicas to detect latent faults, and automated recovery to reduce repair times and costs.
Tradeoffs
Unfortunately, these strategies are not necessarily orthogonal, and some can have adverse affects on reliability. Here we consider the effects of auditing and automated recovery. There are many other possible tradeoffs, such as the costs of increased independence of administrative domains and diversity of hardware and software that we do not cover here.
Auditing is necessary for detecting latent faults, but as previously described, it increases the frequency of media access, which might increase both visible and latent media errors and costs due to increased consumption of power and other system and administrative resources. Previous work [23, 44, 50] suggests it is possible to achieve an appropriate balance that increases reliability considerably while performing much of the audit work in background, even opportunistically when legitimate data accesses require powering on the corresponding system components.
Unfortunately, the audit process can itself introduce other channels for data corruption. An example would be attacking a distributed system through the audit protocol itself [33] , which therefore must be designed as carefully as any other distributed protocol.
While automated recovery can reduce costs and speed up recovery times, if buggy or compromised by an attacker, it can itself introduce latent faults. This can be dangerous because even visible faults can now (though seemingly having been recovered) turn into latent ones.
Data gathering
Our simple model of reliability of replicated storage points out areas where we are in great need of further data to validate the model and to evaluate the potential utility of the reliability strategies described in this paper. In particular, there is very little published about the types and distribution of latent faults, both due to media errors and also due to the other threats we describe. Moreover, the correlations that result in latent faults are poorly understood.
One desirable application of the model would be choosing, for instance, between two levels of replication and audit. Assume that for disaster tolerance we have two geographically independent replica systems. Would it be better for each system to audit its storage internally? Or would it be better to audit between the two replicas? Answering such a question requires understanding, at a minimum: the MTTF of both visible and latent faults, the MDL of different audit strategies, the recovery strategies, the costs of replicating information internally and geographically, and the costs of auditing internally versus between sites.
To gather this information we can instrument existing systems. For a start, we can log occurrences of visible faults, detection of latent faults, and occurrences of data loss. One approach for detecting latent faults is to cycle proactively through the storage logging checksums of immutable objects. Ideally, these fault occurrences would include timestamps and vertical information about the location of the fault: block, sector, disk, file, application, etc. We would use such information to determine the distributions and rates of the faults that we consider, thereby testing the validity of our assumptions. Additionally, we can log information about recovery procedures performed (e.g., replacement of disks or recovery from tape), their duration, and outcomes. We could use such data to measure mean recovery times and, combined with the previous information, validate the model itself. We could employ metadata about the configuration: media, hardware, software, etc., to estimate costs. Finally, we could log SMART data from disks, and external information such as application workloads offered, processes spawned, file system and network statistics, and administrator changes. We could mine such information to identify and perform root cause analysis for correlated faults.
Efforts are underway to gather some of this information for existing systems. For instance, several groups at UC Santa Cruz, HP Labs and elsewhere have been processing just such failure data from large archives such as the Internet Archive. We need information, though, from many different kinds of storage systems with different replication architectures.
Related Work
In this section we review related work, showing how others address problems, such as correlated and latent faults, that arise when large amounts of data must remain unaltered yet accessible with low latency at low cost. We start with low-level approaches that focus on single devices and RAID arrays, then move up the stack.
Evidence of correlated faults comes from studies of disk farms. Talagala [53] logs every fault in a large disk farm (of 368 disk drives) at UC Berkeley over six months and shows significant correlations between them. The study focuses primarily on media (drive failures), power failures, and system software/dependency failures.
Chen et al. [9] explore the tradeoffs between performance and reliability in RAID systems, noting that system crashes (i.e., correlated faults) and uncorrectable bit errors (i.e., latent faults) can greatly reduce the reliability predicted in the original RAID paper [42] . Kari's dissertation [23] appears to be the first comprehensive analysis of latent disk failures. His model also shows that they can greatly reduce the reliability of RAID systems, and presents four scrubbing algorithms that adapt to disk activity, using idle time to flush out latent errors. In contrast, we explore a broader space that includes application faults and distributed replication.
Enterprise storage systems have recognized the need to address latent and correlated faults. Network Appliance's storage threat model includes two whole-disk failures, and a whole-disk failure with a latent fault discovered during recovery (our P (L 2 |V 1 )). They employ rowdiagonal parity and suggest periodic scrubbing of disks to improve reliability [11] . Schwarz et al. [50] show that opportunistic scrubbing, piggy-backed on other disk activity, performs very well. Like us, they do not depend on the disk to detect a latent fault but actually check the data. Our exploration also includes higher-layer failures.
Database vendors have implemented some application-level techniques to detect corruption. DB2's threat model includes a failure to write a database page spanning multiple sectors atomically. It sprinkles page consistency bits through each page, modifying and checking them on each read and write. These bits detect some other forms of corruption but only those affecting the consistency bits [36] . Tandem NonStop systems write checksums to disk with the data, and compare them when data are read back [8] .
The IRON File System [44] is a file system whose threat model includes latent faults and silent corruption of the disk. It protects the file system's metadata (but not the data) using checksums and in-disk replication.
An alternative to tightly-coupled replication such as RAID is more loosely-coupled distributed replication. In 1990 Saltzer suggested that digital archives need geographically distributed replicas to survive natural disasters, that they must proactively migrate to new media to survive media obsolescence, and that heavy-duty forward error correction could correct corruption that can accumulate when data are rarely accessed [49] . More recently, these ideas inform the design of the British Library's digital archive [7] .
Many distributed peer-to-peer storage architectures have been proposed to provide highly-available and persistent storage services, including the Eternity Service [5] , Intermemory [10] , CFS [12] , OceanStore [26] , PAST [48] , and Tangler [57] . Their threat models vary, but include powerful adversaries (Eternity Service) and multiple failures. Some (OceanStore) use cryptographic sharing to proliferate n partial replicas from any m < n of which they can recover the data. Others (PAST) replicate whole files. Weatherspoon's [58] model compares the reliability of these approaches. While the model itself does not include latent errors, correlated errors, or others such as operational or human errors, it takes into account the storage and bandwidth requirements of each approach. Later work [59] identifies correlations among replicas (e.g., geographic or administrative) and informs the replication policy to reduce correlation effects.
Deep Store [61] and the LOCKSS system [33] share the belief that preserving large amounts of data for long periods affordably is a major design challenge. Deep Store addresses the cost issues by eliminating redundancy, LOCKSS by using a "network appliance" approach to reducing system administration [47] , and large numbers of loosely coupled replicas on low-cost hardware. Both recognize the threats of "bit rot" and format obsolescence to long-term preservation.
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we motivate the need for long-term storage of digital information and examine the threats to such information. Using an extended reliability model that incorporates latent faults, correlated faults, and the detection time of latent faults, we reason about possible strategies for improving long-term reliability of these systems. The cost of these strategies is important, since limited budget is one of the key threats to digital preservation. We find that the most important strategies are auditing to detect latent faults as soon as possible, automating repair so that it is as fast, cheap, and as reliable as possible, and increasing the independence of data replicas. This is clearly a work in progress. We do not yet have data to characterize all the terms in our model. The model thus points to several data collection projects that would be very useful. For instance, we need more data on the mean time to different types of latent faults, the repair times for faults once detected, and the levels of correlation of different kinds of faults. We are currently seeking out sources of these data and instrumenting systems to gather more.
A digital preservation system should rarely suffer incidents that could cause data loss. Thus the total experience base available to designers of such systems will grow very slowly with time, making it difficult to identify and fix the problems that will undoubtedly arise. Past incidents indicate that it will in practice be very difficult to accumulate this experience base. The host organization's typical response to an incident causing data loss is to cover it up. A few details become known via the grapevine, but the true story never becomes part of the experience base. A system similar to NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System [37] should be established, through which operators of storage systems could submit reports of incidents, even those not resulting in data loss, for others to read in anonymized form and from which they can learn how to improve the reliability of their own systems.
